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its effect on, first, subsequent case holdings and, second, subsequent
statutes enacted by the legislature. On the broader issue of exclusion,
the Court has apparently rejected the New York view as expressed in
Valente28 by holding that the press, as members of the public, do
have an enforceable right to attend court proceedings (or at least
public trials). This aspect of the decision could be abused. However, if newspapers do not seek to control the course of court proceedings, but only report what they are entitled to "see, behold, and
hear,"29 then the public's right to be in attendance at court proceedings as an interested party will be protected and the public will
have gained a needed right in order to promote and preserve proper
administration of justice. Concerning the issue regarding publication

of the names of juveniles involved in trials, the Court has taken a
stand which hopefully will bring about enactment of a statute by the
legislature which will serve to protect witnesses and victims from the
unnecessary consequences of social degradation.
Julia Johns Kurtz

InuN-MuNiciPAL LLmnrr.-In March,
1964, the Ohio River was rising toward flood stage at Louisville. Representatives of the Louisville Seed Company contacted the City of
Louisville and received assurances from the flood control department,
the mayor and other city officials that gates in the municipal flood wall
system would be in place in time to prevent damage to the company's
property and merchandise. The flood wall gates were not installed in
time and the company's property and inventory were damaged by
the resulting flood. The Louisville Seed Co. brought suit against the
City of Louisville for damages based on the city's negligence in failing
to install the gates. The plaintiff was awarded a judgment on a jury
verdict in the amount of $86,771.48. The City of Louisville appealed.
Held: Reversed. A municipal corporation may not be held liable in
tort for the negligent performance of a function which is inherently
part of the carrying on of government and where the performance of
this function affects all members of the general public alike. City of
Louisville v. Louiswille Seed Company, 483 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1968).
One of the most difficult and confusing problems which the Kentucky Court and other courts throughout the nation have had to face
TORTs-SovBEIGN

Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 808 N.Y. 71, 128 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
LeViness, Cime News, 66 U.S. L. REv. 370 (1932).

28 United
29
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has been the doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability. It is
almost universally recognized that this doctrine had its beginning in
the classic English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon' and was
brought to this country by the Massachusetts court in Mower v.
2

Leicester.

The concept of municipal immunity has been one of the most
widely debated of legal rules, eliciting more than two hunderd law
journal articles, 3 nearly all of which have been critical of both the
1 100 Eng. Rep. 859, 2 T.R. 667 (1788).
29 Mass. 247 (1812). The historical basis for the doctrine of municipal

immunity was lucidly described in a recent decision by the Minnesota court:
All of the paths leading to the origin of governmental tort immunity converge on Russell v. Men of Devon. This product of the English common
law was left on our doorstep to become the putative ancestor of a long
line of American cases beginning with Mower v. Leicester. Russell sued
all the male inhabitants of the County of Devon for damages occurring
to his wagon by reason of a bridge being out of repair. It was apparently
undisputed that the county had a duty to maintain such structures.
The court held that the action would not lie because: (1) To permit it
would lead to 'an infinity of actions,' (2) there was no precedent for
attempting such a suit, (8) only the legislature should impose liability
of this kind, (4) even if defendants are to be considered a corporation or
quasi-corporation there is no fund out of which to satisfy the claim,
(6) there is a strong presumption that what has never been done cannot
be done, and (7) although there is a legal principle which permits a
remedy for every injury resulting from the neglect of another, a more
applicable principle is 'that it is better that an individual should sustain
an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.! The court
concluded that the suit should not be permitted 'because the action must
be brought against the public.' (Italics supplied.) There is no mention
of 'the king can do no wrong,' but on the contrary it is suggested that
the plaintiff sue the county itself rather than its individual inhabitants.
Every reason assigned by the court is born of expedience. The wrong
to plaintiff is submerged in the convenience of the public. No moral,
ethical, or rational reason for the decision is advanced by the court except
the practical problem of assessing damages against individual defendants.
The court's invitation to the legislature has a familiar ring. It was
finally accepted as to claims against the Crown in 1947, although Russell
had long since been overruled.
In 1912 when Mower's horse was killed by stepping in a hole on
the Leicester bridge, counsel argued that 'Men of Devon' did not apply
since the town of Leicester was incorporated and had a treasury out of
which to satisfy a judgment. The Massachusetts court nevertheless held
that the town had no notice of the defect and that quasi-corporations are
not liable for such neglect under common law. On the authority of 'Men
of Devon' recovery was denied. It was on this shaky foundation that the
law of governmental tort immunity was erected ....

Spanel v. Mounds

View
School District, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1962).
3
See e.g., Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463 (1963); Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. LJ. 131 (1952); Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction
Between Public & Private Functions, 16 OnE. L. REv. 250 (1937); Bernstein,
(Continued on next page)
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doctrine itself and of its application. 4 Treatise writers too have not
looked on the doctrine with an especially favorable eye. 5
Until 1964, Kentucky followed the majority rule8 of distinguishing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Governmental Tort Liability and Immunity in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. RE:. 486
(1961); Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A
Comparative Survey, 9 LAw & CoNTunp. PROB. 181 (1942); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); Davis, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units, 40 MrNN. L. REV. 751 (1956); Fuller & Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation,54 HAzv. L. REv. 437 (1941); Harno, Tort Immunity
of Municipal Corporations,4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Price & Smith, Municipal Tort
Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 FLA. L. REv. 330 (1953); Repko, American
Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv.
41 (1949); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REv.
97 (1932).
4
In beginning his series of articles on sovereign immunity, Prof. Borchard
says of the doctrine:
The reason for this long-continued and growing injustice in AngloAmerican law rests, of course, upon a medieval English theory that the
'King can do no wrong,' which without sufficient understanding was
introduced with the common law into this country, and has survived
mainly by reason of its antiquity. The facts that the conditions which
gave it birth and that the theory of absolutism which kept it alive in
England never prevailed in this country and have since been discarded
by the most monarchical countries of Europe, have nevertheless been
unavailing to secure legislative reconsideration of the propriety and
justification of the rule.... Borchard, supra note 3, at 2.
A widely quoted American Law Reports Annotation condemns the doctrine of
municipal immunity as a grossly anachronistic practice:
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for torts
rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that in this modern
age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the
medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the maxim, 'the King can
do no wrong,' should exempt the various branches of the government
from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage
resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed
upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed
among the entire community constituting the government, where it
could be borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it
justly belongs. Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
5 See generally, 2 C. ANmnAu, MuNIciPAL CORPORA-MON LAW §§ 11.00-13.05
(1968); 18 E. McQutirm, MUNIcIPAL CoanPoRAuToNs §§ 53.01-53.171 (1963);
W. PnossEn, LAw OF ToRTs § 125 (1964).
6 The following is a statement of the almost universally recognized rule:
...[I]n the absence of statutory provision, there can be no recovery
against a municipal corporation for injuries occasioned by its negligence
or nonfeasance in the exercise of functions essentially governmental in
character. In the exercise of such functions, the municipal corporation
is acting for the general public as well as the inhabitants of its territory,
and represents in such capacity the sovereignty of the state. No liability
attaches to it at common law, either for the nonuse or misuse of such
power or for the acts or omissions on the part of its officers or agents
through whom such functions are performed, or of servants employed
by agencies carrying out governmental functions of the corporation. 38
AM. JuR. Municipal Corporations § 572 (1941).
See generally, 38 AM. JuR. Municipal Corporations §§ 571-95 (1941).
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between governmental and proprietary functions of a municipal corporation and holding it liable in tort for the latter, but immune from tort
liability for the former.7 In literally hundreds of cases the Court has
dealt with this problem and has identified those activities for which a
municipal corporation would be held liable" and those for which it
would not be held liable.9
7 The Court has dealt with the governmental-proprietary distinction a number
of times. Following is a representative example:
A municipality in the exercise of certain of its corporate powers does
perform governmental functions, because such powers are exercised by
it for the benefit of the public generally, and in their exercise its represents and is an arm of the state. For instance, in matters pertaining to the
public health and to the maintenance of charitable, penal, reformatory,
and similar public institutions it acts in its public capacity because the
public generally is vitally interested in such activities. But when the
municipality exercises only such powers and privileges as are peculiarly
for its own benefit or for the benefit of its own citizens or those of its
immediate locality, it is acting in its private or strictly corporate capacity,
as distinguished from its capacity as an arm of, and part of, the state.
Lampton & Burke v. Wood, 199 Ky. 250, 253 S.W. 980, 987 (1923).
See also, Smith v. City of Lexington, 307 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1957); City of
Elizabethtown v. Caswell, 261 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1953); O'Connell v. Merchants'
& Police Dist. Tel. Co., 167 Ky. 468, 180 S.W. 845 (1915); Twyman's Adm'r v.
Board of Councilmen of Frankfort, 117 Ky. 518, 78 S.W. 446 (1904).
8 City of Elizabethtown v. Baker, 373 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1963), Commonwealth v. General & Excess Ins. Co., 355 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1962), City of Bowling
Green v. Ford, 263 Ky. 523, 92 S.W.2d 744 (1936), Board of Councilmen of City
of Frankfort v. Buttimer, 146 Ky. 815, 143 S.W. 410 (1912) (defective streets
and sidewalks, provided city has actual or constructive notice); cf. Seay v. City of
Louisville, 259 Ky. 64, 82 S.W.2d 212 (1935) (city not liable for defects in streets
when it annexes a section and leaves streets as they were without undertaking to
make improvements), Board of Council of City of Danville v. Fox, 142 Ky. 476,
134 S.W. 883 (1911) (city not liable for damages during construction of streets),
City of Louisville v. Pirtle, 297 Ky. 553, 180 S.W.2d 303 (1944) (city not liable
for streets and walks in a public park if they cannot be considere a part of public
ways of the city); Madisonville v. Nisbet's Admr, 270 Ky. 248, 109 S.WV.2d 593
(1937) (distribution of electricity); Flutmus v. City of Newport, 175 Ky. 817,
194 S.W. 1039 (1917) (maintenance of waterworks); cf. Yowell v. Lebanon
Waterworks Co., 254 Ky. 345, 71 S.W.2d 658 (1934) (city-owned water compay
not liablefor negligent failure to furnish water to extinguish fire); City of Hopkinsville v. Burchett, 254 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1953) (operation of a cemetery).
9 Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metrop. Sewer Dist. 346 S.W.2d 754
(Ky. 1961) (construction of sewers); Seay v. City of Louisville 259 Ky. 64, 82
S.W.2d 212 (1935) (construction of sewers, but city liable for negligent
maintenance of sewers after construction completed); Caudill v. Pinsion, 233 Ky.
12, 24 S.W.2d 938 (1930), Jolly's Adm'x v. City of Hopkinsville, 89 Ky. 279, 12
S.W. 313 (1889), Pollock's Adm'r v. City of Louisville, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 221
(1877) (actions of police); Baker v. City of Lexington, 310 S.W.2d 555 (Ky.
1958), V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957), City of Louisville v. Pirtle, 297 Ky. 553, 180 S.W.2d 303 (1944) (maintenance of public
parks); Small v. City of Frankfort, 203 Ky. 188, 261 S.W. 1111 (1924), City of
Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S.W. 672 (1912), Davis v. City of
Lebanon, 108 Ky. 688, 57 S.W. 471 (1900), Greenwood v. City of Louisville,
76 Ky. (13 Bush) 226 (1877) (operation of a fire department); Hagan v. City
of Owensboro, 271 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1954), City of Louisville v. Hebmann, 161
Ky. 523, 171 S.W. 165 (1914) (collection of garbage); Having v. City of Covington, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1617, 78 S.W. 431 (1904), City of Paducah v. Allen 111
(Continued on next page)
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In 1964, in Haney v. City of Lexington, ° the Court followed the
lead of the Florida court which had repudiated, to a great extent, the
doctrine of municipal immunity in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach." The Florida court examined the traditional bases and justifications for municipal immunity and found them inconsistent with the
12
modem concept of municipal corporations.
The Court noted in Haney that it had, in recent years, made a
growing number of exceptions to the immunity rule and could no
longer support the doctrine by logic, justice or experience.' 3 The Court
found itself in agreement with the California court which three years
earlier had stated: "The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an
anachronism, without rational basis, and has existed only by force of
inertia." 14 In 1957 the Kentucky Court had looked at the municipal
immunity doctrine in light of the Hargrove decision, and concluded
that although change was desirable, it was a matter of legislative
discretion and the Court would have to content itself with criticism
of the rule. 1 In Haney, the Court stated that this position had been
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Ky. 361, 63 S.W. 980 (1901) (operation of a pest house, but city is liable if it
maintains any public institution classified as a nuisance); Browder v. City of
Henderson, 182 Ky. 771, 207 S.W. 479 (1919) (operation of a city hospital);
White v. City of Hopkinsville, 222 Ky. 664, 1 S.W.2d 1068 (1928), Braunstein v.
City of Louisville, 146 Ky. 777, 143 S.W. 372 (1912) (operation of a city rock
quarry); Clark v. City of Nicholasville, 120 Ky. 574, 87 S.W. 300 (1905), Ernst
v. City of West Covington, 116 Ky. 850, 76 S.W. 1089 (1903) (school districts
allowed to claim municipal immunity); Duncan v. Brothers, 344 S.W.2d 398
(Ky. 1961), McCray v. City of Louisville, 332 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1960) (false
arrest and imprisonment); Allison v. Cash, 143 Ky. 679, 137 S.W. 245 (1911)
(public health board); Leavell v. Western Ky. Asylum for the Insane, 122 Ky.
213, 91 S.W. 671 (1906) (operation of an insane asylum); Williamson v. Louisville Indus. School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065 (1894) (operation of a
reform school); City of Bowling Green v. Rogers 142 Ky. 558, 134 S.W. 921
(1911) (operation of city jail); City of Louisville v. Carter, 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W.
985 (1911), Maydwell v. City of Louisville, 116 Ky. 885, 76 S.W. 1091 (1903)
(sprinkling city streets); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. F. Struck Const. Co., 41 F.
Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (municipal immunity extended to deliberate as well
as negligent torts).
10386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
"196
So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
2
1 In looking at the rule of municipal immunity from tort liability, the
Florida court described its objections:
The immunity theory has been . .. supported with the idea that it is
better for an individual to suffer a grievous wrong than to impose liability
on the people vicariously through their government. If there is anything
more a sham to our constitutional guarantee that the courts shall
always be open to redress wrongs and to our sense of justice that there
shall be a remedy for every wrong committed, then certainly this basis
for the rule cannot be supported. Id. at 132.
13 886 S.W.2d at 739.
14 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, -, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961).
15 V. T. C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957).
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incorrect; and that indeed it was the duty of the Court to correct an
unjust rule which had been judicially created.16 The new doctrine
thus stated was that the rule is liability and the exception immunity,' 7
basically a reversal of the traditional position. The Court noted, however, that this decision did not impose liability on a municipality in
the exercise of its legislative or judicial, or quasi-legislative or quasijudicial functions.' 8
In repudiating the doctrine of municipal immunity from tort
liability, the Court placed itself among at least a dozen states which
have judicially abrogated, in varying degrees, the municipal immunity
19
rule.
The Court has applied the rule of the Haney decision a number of
times since its inception m but Louisville Seed Co. is the first major
re-examination of the rule. In the instant case the Court finds it necessary to go beyond the broad repudiation of municipal immunity found
in Haney and determine more specifically the limits of actions that
will be permitted against municipalities.
The Court begins in Louisville Seed Co. with the premise that,
"It is immediately recognized that there must be some limitations
[in holding municipal corporations liable],"21 considering the wide
scope of activities in which a municipality is engaged. The Court attempts to reach some middle ground which will protect both the
individual and society, i.e., the municipal corporations. In looking
at leading decisions from two other jurisdictions facing a similar pro16 886 S.W.2d at 741.
17 Id. at 740.
18 Id.

19City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962) (applying
Oregon court's construction of Oregon statutes which were applied to Alaska by
Congress in 1884); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove v.. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130
(Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Corman v. Adams, 259 Iowa 75, 143 N.W.2d 648 (1966)
(limited doctrine in that governmental function no longer raises presumption of
immunity); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (municipality liable
for negligent acts of commission); Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 912, 390
P.2d 2 (1964) (municipal corporation does not retain immunity when state
has enacted statute wherein state is subject to suit); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,
17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
20 City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1967) (liable for
negligent acts of police in auto wreck between police car and car of private
person); Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Bd. of Health, 389 S.W.2d 637
(Ky. 1965) (board of health can no longer claim municipal immunity); Burton
v. Somerset City Hosp., 388 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1965) (city operated hospital
not immune from liability).
21433 S.W.2d at 641.
22

d.

19691

CoMmTis

blem,23 and at the basic purposes of tort liability, 24 the Court concluded that the most equitable middle ground lay in analogizing tort
situations between municipalities and individuals with ordinary tort
actions between private persons, holding the municipality liable in
those situations where it acts like a private person and where a
private person would be liable.25 The Court noted that preceding
opinions had, in effect, applied this standard without identifying it as
such.26 The Court apparently believes that justice can best be achieved
for both the municipal corporation and the individual by use of this
rule-that a city should not be held liable for performing a function in
which a private person does not naturally engage, i.e., one which is
inherently a function of government (e.g., fire and police protection or
flood control), and where the city does not single out or deal with
the individual on an individual basis but is dealing with all of the
general public alike.27 The situation in Louisville Seed Co. falls directly
within this classification according to the Court-flood control being
an inherent function of government and the injured party not having
been dealt with on an individual basis nor having had its loss isolated
from that of the general public.28
The Court was certainly justified in adding this further construction
to the rule it first set out in Haney, but this new position does raise a
number of questions. In the instant case the Court notes, "It is difficult
to perceive how the cause of justice can be advanced by turning back
the pages of history."29 The Court did not actually, "turn back any
pages"-it certainly did not go as far as the City of Louisville requested
by reverting to the pre-Haney rule-but neither did the Court, in
Louisville Seed Co., move forward toward making municipalities more
liable for the wrongs that they commit. This decision could in fact be
viewed as a move back toward the pre-Haney era of increased municipal immunity. One could very well replace, "ultimate function of
government," "risk which is inherently part of the carrying on of the
function of government," and "act [affecting] all members of the
23

Steinhaardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1961);
Steitz24v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. 704 (1945).
"[I]ts purpose is to compensate the injured, to spread the loss and to deter
others from committing like wrongs." 433 S.W.2d at 642.
25 Id. at 643.
26 City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1967) (City was
operating a motor vehicle); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.
1964) (City was operating a swimming pool, maintaining property as a private
citizen would).
27433 S.W.2d at 648.
28 Id.
291d. at 640.
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general public alike,"3 0 with the term governmental function, and
replace "activities [which seek out or separate] the individual from
the general public and [deal] with him on an individual basis,"31
with proprietaryfunction, and the state of the law would be virtually
back to where it was prior to Haney. Judging from the tenor of the
opinion here, the Court has no intention of taking this step backward, but the classifications which have been set up easily lend themselves to such a move.
The Court also seems to have slipped into a "parade of horrors"
type of justification in this decision in noting the "crushing burden"
that could be imposed on a city through flood damage or fire damage
for which it might be held liable. But the Court fails to give any
factual historical example where such a burden was actually imposed
on a municipal corporation or would have been imposed without the
safeguard of immunity. This justification for municipal immunity has
33
been questioned before and found somewhat lacking in support. It
seems highly doubtful that in modem times a truly "crushing burden"
would ever be imposed on a municipality. With today's modem buildings and modern fire-fighting equipment and methods, it is doubtful
that a municipal fire department would be so negligent as to cause
damages which would bankrupt a city. It's hard to believe that Mrs.
O'Leary's cow could succeed in burning down Chicago today-even if
that city's fire department were grossly negligent. As far as flood
damage is concerned, a city would of course be held liable only for
those floods which could reasonably be forseen, and one must question
whether a city's negligent failure to protect against such a flood would
cause the widespread damage intimated by the court. If we are concerned with justice in our legal system, that concern would not appear to be fostered by a policy that provides an individual with no
legal remedy for the results of a city's negligent failure to provide
adequate fire protection, or to properly install flood gates, or to provide
other services which citizens rightfully rely on, whether they be inherent functions of government or not.
The major question thus raised by this decision is just how far has
the Court come in abrogating the doctrine of municipal immunity
from tort liability? One might view Haney as a giant step forward and
30 All of these phrases were used in Louisville Seed Co. to describe areas in
which31 the city would not be held liable. Id. at 642.
This phrase was used in Lousille Seed Co. to describe areas in which a
municipality would be held liable. Id.
321d. at 643.
33 See, e.g., Alystyne, supra note 3, at 510; Fuller & Casner, supra note 3, at
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Louisville Seed Co. as a small step backward; but regardless of this
and of some apparent inconsistencies and questionable conclusions in
the instant case, the Court has developed a more workable and just
system of dealing with tort actions against municipal corporations
than had previously existed under the old tradition based on the
governmental-proprietary distinction. What the Court will do with the
Louisville Seed Co. test will of course have to wait until another opportunity to rule in this area arises. It appears, however, that although
the court stated in Haney and feiterated in Louisville Seed Co., that
it was the duty of the Court to correct an unjust rule which had been
judicially created,3 4 it is prepared to go no further in repudiating the
rule of municipal immunity than it has gone in the instant case. The
Court is thus, intentionally or by inference, leaving any further
change in the rule to the province of the legislature where it more
properly belongs. The legislature can best provide the consistency and
uniformity sorely needed in this area by the depth study and consideration of some of the overall problems dealing with effective
deterrence of negligent acts, creation of effective risk-spreading devices
such as municipal or private liability insurance, and identification of
those municipal functions which require complete immunity from
private interference through damage liability claims. A problem of
these dimensions reguires a comprehensive legislative solution rather
than an uncertain rule of law derived piecemeal from various court
decisions.
c. Grey Pash, ir.
34 386 S.W.2d at 741.

